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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

The cause of action that is before this Court originated with a counterclaim filed by the
Defendant, New Sweden Irrigation District ("New Sweden") for (1) a declaratory judgment
confirming that it held a statutory easement pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-1102 for purposes of
cleaning, repairing and maintaining the Sinkhole irrigation canal running along the entire
westerly boundary of land owned by the Plaintiff, Bradley K. Morgan ("Morgan"); (2) a
declaratory judgment specifically defining the scope of that easement; (3) claiming that Morgan
had placed and/or constructed encroachments within the scope of that easement and asking for a
declaratory judgment specifically ordering the removal of those encroachments by Morgan and at
his own expense; and, (4) for an injunction preventing Morgan from interfering with access to
the easement by the Defendant. The dispute arose from an incident that occurred on June 25,
2009, when an employee of New Sweden entered on the Morgan property driving a huge, fullsized tractor, trailing an 8-foot wide mower and to which there was attached on the right side a
mowing blade that could be extended approximately another 8 feet and for the alleged purpose of
mowing along the banks of the canal that crosses the Morgan property. Morgan disputed the
reasonable and necessary use of that particular equipment for the cleaning or maintaining of the
canal based on facts that confinned this equipment had never been used at that location for 35+
years during which Morgan or his family had owned this property.
A Judgment was entered by the District Court on August 16, 2012, which purports to
grant summary judgment to New Sweden in relevant parts as follows:
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I. New Sweden owns a right-of-way along the Sinkhole irrigation canal that runs the
length of Morgan's western boundary;
2. That right-of-way is sixteen (16) feet wide on each side of the irrigation canal based
upon the type of equipment that is commonly used to clean, maintain, or repair the irrigation
canal;
3. New Sweden is entitled, pursuant to statute, to clean, maintain, and repair the
irrigation canal, including the banks of the canal and which includes the right to remove
vegetation and trees growing along and within the right-of-way;
4. Any and all encroachments located within the sixteen (16) foot wide right-of-way,
including, but not limited to outbuildings (horse manger and garage), sprinkler equipment, trees,
and a garden plot, must be removed; and,
5. Morgan is enjoined from taking any action that umeasonably interferes with New
Sweden's right to operate their equipment within the right-of-way.
The Judgment entered on August 16, 2012, does not address any of the following issues:
1. The identification of the type of equipment that is commonly used by New Sweden to
clean, maintain, or repair this particular section of the Sinkhole irrigation canal and to which this

Judgment pertains.
2. The entry or exit point or points to the easement by New Sweden.
3. Whether the right of New Sweden to remove vegetation and trees growing along and
within the right-of-way includes the right to demand that Morgan be responsible for the removal
of such vegetation and trees, especially ifhe neither planted, nor placed that vegetation and/or
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those trees within that right-of-way.
4. Who is responsible for the removal and/or the cost of removal of any particular
encroachment within that right-of-way, including whether New Sweden can demand that Morgan
be responsible for the removal and/or cost of removal of any of such encroachments, especially if
he neither constrncted, nor placed a particular encroachment within that right-of-way.
5. When any such encroachments must be removed, especially if it is factually
determined that New Sweden is no longer using and/or capable of using the specifically defined
equipment for cleaning, maintaining, or repairing this particular section of the Sinkhole irrigation
canal and to which this Judgment pertains.
The above-referenced Judgment entered on August 16, 2012, was appealed to this Court
by Morgan and in Morgan v. Nev,: Siveden Irrigation Dist., 156 Idaho 247, 322 P.3d 980 (2014),
this Court affirmed the decision of the District Court, although many of the above-referenced
issues relative to the scope or use of this easement were noted, but remanded for a more precise
description of the easement held by New Sweden.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW ON REMA."l',JD

A. Trial Proceedings.
New Sweden's counterclaim for declaratory judgment expressly requested trial by jury on
all issues of fact relevant to the scope ofNew Sweden's right-of-way pursuant to Rule 38(b) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (IRCP). On remand, Morgan filed a motion dated May 12,
2014, for trial by jury on all factual issues that remained to be determined by the District Court
pursuant to IRCP Rules 38 and 39, to which New Sweden filed its objection on May 19, 2014, on
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the basis that only equitable issues remained to be resolved. That motion was heard by the
District Court on June 17, 2014, The District Court acknowledged that there were factual issues
requiring an evidentiary hearing, but in the Afinute EntJy and Order dated June 20, 2014, denied
the motion for a jury trial and over the objection of the Plaintiff the matter was set for trial before
the District Court without a jury.
Both parties had identified as trial exhibits a number of photographs to illustrate the
actual application and use of the easement by New Sweden; Morgan identified the new By-laws
adopted by New Sweden in 2012 after entry of the original Judgment and which now defines the
width of the easement as 16-feet and defines where the easement starts and ends from the edge of
the canal for all property owners; Morgan identified brochures currently being used by New
Sweden and which illustrate the width of the easement and showing that it starts at the water line,
not the top of the bank or the toe of a berm or levy; and, Morgan identified as witnesses the
current members of the Board of Directors for New Sweden to testify as to what they understand
and believe is the scope of New Sweden's easement and the proper use of that easement in this
particular case. At the time of the pretrial conference, the District Court restricted the witnesses
and exhibits to those that had been previously identified in the course of the summary judgment
proceedings. The District Court did not allow any of the new photographs offered by both sides
that may have illustrated the use or non-use of the specific equipment that was at issue; the
District Court did not allow the testimony of current members of the Board of Directors on any
issue before the District Court; and, the District Court refused to consider the By-laws of New
Sweden that had been amended in 2012 after the District Court's decision and which in
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ARTICLE XII DISTRIBUTION OF WATER Section 1. Water Management, paragraph (n) on
page 9, the amended By-Laws now expressly provide as to all owners of irrigated land within the
District and as to all sections of its canal that "The minimum easement for maintenance and
operation of the canals is defined as 16 feet of flat surface along each side of the canal, or to the
outside toe of a levied bank." R. p. 50. Morgan argued that a decision of this Court doing
nothing more than defining where the location of the easement starts on the Morgan property is
rendered moot by this amendment to the By-Laws of the New Sweden Irrigation District. The
District Court concluded otherwise and the matter proceeded to trial.
The only witness called on behalf of New Sweden was its manager, Kail Sheppard, whose
affidavit testimony was relied upon by the District Court as a basis for entry of the original
Judgment entered on August 16, 2012, and who was allowed to testify over the objection of the

Plaintiff as to what he considered to be the precise definition of New Sweden's reasonable and
necessary easement, even though Mr. Sheppard now admitted that as to the issues before the
District Court he had never been identified as an expert witness on any of those issues; and, in
fact, admitted that"/ don't believe that I'm an expert at anything." Trial T p. 27, II. 13-17.

(emphasis added.)
As indicated, the District Court denied Mr. Morgan's request to include the testimony of
each of the current members of the Board of Directors for New Sweden. As a result, only
Bradley K. Morgan was allowed to testify on behalf of the Plaintiff and his undisputed testimony
confirmed that if you come down the slope of the canal bank on his property to where there is 16
feet of flat surface, the excavator would not be close enough to be able to reach into the canal,
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Trial T p. 42, ll 7-11; if you come down the slope of the canal bank on his property to where

there is 16 feet of flat surface where the gravel is located, there is nothing to mow, Trial T p. 42,

ll. 12-15; if you come down the slope of the canal bank on his property to where there is 16 feet
of flat surface where the lawn is installed, there is nothing to mow, because it is already mowed
every other week clear to the water level, Trial T p. 42, ll. 16-19; and, if you come down the
slope of the canal bank on his property to where there is 16 feet of flat surface where the alfalfa
field is located, you would be simply mowing across the alfalfa field, not the banks of the canal,
and the alfalfa field is mowed by Morgan every other week for fire hazards, Trial T p. 42, ll. 2025, Trial T p. 43, ll. 1-5.

At the end of the trial, the District Court expressed concern that the canal company could
begin its measurement after some period of slope and acknowledged that it is not enough to say
that the measurement starts at the point where the slope ends, reasoning that the canal company
can maintain their canal by modifying the slope and those sorts of things. Trial T p. 43, ll. 1625; Trial T p. 44, ll. 1-11. The Plaintiff agreed, emphasizing that there are sections along the

canal where there is a slope and as a result the mower is not used and cannot be used; there are
sections along the canal where the excavator can only be used on one side and it is not necessary
to use the excavator on both sides of the canal and new photographs offered by New Sweden
would have confirmed that the excavator is only used on one side in those sections, including a
photograph of the use of the excavator on the land across the canal from the Morgan property
where there is already a 16-foot wide road running the length of the Morgan property; and, that
the District Court had, and now has, the opportunity to precisely defined the easement as to what
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was reasonable and necessary for each piece of equipment along this section of the canal in order
to address the above-referenced issues. Trial T p. 44, ll. 1-25; Trial T p. 45, ll. 1-20.
B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
The District Court declined the opportunity to precisely define the easement as requested
and entered its Findings ofFact and Conclusions of Law on July 25, 2014, finding that the single
issue to be addressed was where the width of the 16-foot easement was to begin; that some
stretches of land bordering the canal on Morgan's property are flat at the top of the canal bank
and some portions have a berm or levy at the top of the canal bank, sloping down away from the
canal bank to a flat surface; and, that New Sweden needs sixteen feet of flat surface, exclusive of
the canal banks, in order to operate its equipment safely. R. p. 30 (emphasis added.) The

District Court did not address its own above-referenced concerns that the measurement
should not begin after some period of slope.
Based on these findings, the District Court concluded that its judgment "must describe the
lands specifically and with such certainty that the court's mandate in connection therewith may
be executed, and such that rights and liabilities are clearly fixed and that all parties affected
thereby may readily understand and comply with the requirements thereof." Citing, Kosanke v.
Kopp, 74 Idaho 302, 307, 261 P. 2d 815, 818 (1953) (emphasis added.) R. p. 31. The only other

reference in the District Court's conclusions oflaw was to Idaho Code§ 42-1102 which creates
the right to enter the land across which the right-of-way extends, for the purpose of the cleaning,
maintaining and repair of the canal, limiting the width of the easement to only that which is
reasonable and necessary. R. p. 31.
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In spite of the cited standards for specifically defining the easement, the District Court
only addressed the single issue of where the easement was to start and concluded that where the
16-foot easement was to begin was to be based on "Where portions of Morgan's property stretch
out flat from the top of the canal bank, the 16-foot easement should be measured at the top of the
bank before the bank begins its descent to the water. Where portions of Morgan's property
abutting the canal bank is bermed or levied, the 16-foot easement should be measured from the
outside toe of the berm, levy or bank, where the land begins to level out. The length of the
easement extends along the entire length of the canal as it borders Morgan's property." R. p. 32.
The District Court did not address how to measure the 16-foot easement in those sections
where the land slopes for an extended distance from the top of the canal bank before it becomes
flat, even though the District Court had expressed that concern during the course of the trial. The
District Court did acknowledge that both parties had asked that the Court enter an order
regarding responsibility for the removal of existing encroachments withing the easement, but
declined. In doing so, the District Court incorrectly concluded that the prior Judgment entered on
August 16, 2012, expressly ordered that Morgan remove all encroachments from within the
easement. As indicated above, that original Judgment does order that all encroachments be
removed, but does not order that Morgan is responsible for the removal of all such
encroachments. R. p. 32. It should be noted that this Court in 1vforgan v. New Sweden, supra
156 Idaho at 255,322 P.3d at 988; citing, Pioneer Irr. Dist. 153 Idaho at 599,288 P.3d at 816,
confirmed that the servient owner should only be responsible for those encroachments which he
caused or placed in the easement, although the language in that decision does affirm the District
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Court's decision that :Morgan must remove encroachments" without specifying what
encroachments. Id. At this point in time, the only encroachment that Morgan placed in the
easement and which remains is the one building consisting of a garage and horse manger. The
garden plot was destroyed and has not been replanted and Morgan did not plant any trees within
the easement. The power transfonners belong to Rocky Mountain Power and this Court noted
that it is the responsibility of the irrigation district to request that the party responsible remove
the encroachment. Id.
C. Judgment.

On Remand, the District Court entered the Judgment on August 20, 2014, stating that
"New Sweden Irrigation District, owns a right-of-way along the Sinkhole irrigation canal that
runs the entire length of the Bradley K. Morgan property. Said 16-foot right-of-way commences
at the top of the bank before the bank begins its descent to the water where pmiions of Morgan's
property stretch out flat from the top of the canal bank. Said 16-foot right-of-way commences
from the outside toe of the berm, levy or bank, where the land begins to level out where portions
of Morgan's property abutting the canal is bermed or levied." R. p. 63. The new judgment that
was entered did not incorporate, nor mention, the prior Judgment that was previously entered on
August 16, 2012, nor did it in any way amend that prior judgment. As a result, there still is not a
judgment entered which identifies the point of entry, identifies who is responsible for the
removal of vegetation within the easement, identifies specific encroachments and assigns
responsibility for the removal of any other encroachments, or determines when such
encroachments must be removed or if they even have to be removed if New Sweden is no longer
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRJEF - Page 9 of 31

using the subject equipment that allegedly mandated removal of any encroachments.

D. Motion to Reconsider.
Prior to the Court having entered the August 20, 2014, Judgment, Morgan responded with
his Afotion to Reconsider & to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact & Conclusions ofLmv that was
filed on August 15, 2014. R. p. 34. New Sweden responded with Defendant's Opposition to
Plaintiff's Jvfotionfor Reconsideration on August 15, 2014. R. p. 54. Morgan responded with
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Jvfotion for Reconsideration filed on

September 2, 2014. R. p. 66.
At the hearing on the motion to reconsider, counsel for the Plaintiff emphasized that the
Judgment entered on August 16, 2012, did not address any of the above-referenced issues and

invited the District Court to reconsider and to alter or amend its new judgment to resolve these
issues. 09/15/14 Hearing T pp. 5-11. The substance of the motion to reconsider was that the
Court take the opportunity to alter or amend its general findings entered on July 25, 2014, to
precisely define all aspects of New Sweden's easement across the Morgan property as is
necessary to permit New Sweden's "reasonable and necessary" use of that easement without
"unduly burdening the servient estate" and to address all of the above-referenced issues that
remained unresolved. It was emphasized that New Sweden had acknowledged in their response
and objection to reconsideration that the Supreme Court indicated in its remand instruction: " ...
we remand for the district court to provide a more precise description of the easement . .. "
citing, Morgan v. New Sweden Irrigation Dist., supra 156 Idaho at 259,322 P.3d at 992

(emphasis added.) R. p. 55. New Sweden further acknowledged in its written response:" ... the
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only issue that can reasonably be challenged is whether the Court correctly ruled on the exact
location of the easement and the Court's description of said easement. (emphasis added.) R. p.

5 5. That is exactly what Morgan was asking; i.e. the there be a final judgment that describes the
lands specifically and with such certainty that the court's mandate in connection therewith may
be executed, and such that rights and liabilities are clearly fixed and that all parties affected
thereby may readily understand and comply with the requirements thereof.
The motion to reconsider did argue that the definition of where the width of the easement
starts should take into consideration the subsequent amendment by New Sweden of its By-Laws
following the original Judgment and which now expressly provides as to all owners of irrigated
land within the District and as to all sections of its canal that "The minimum easement for
maintenance and operation of the canals is defined as 16 feet of flat surface along each side of the
canal, or to the outside toe of a levied bank." R. p. 3 7; R. p. 50.
Further, as indicated by the Idaho Supreme Court on remand, it was argued that entry and
exit must be defined so as to take place in a "reasonable manner as not to increase needlessly the
burden on the servient estate." Morgan v. Nevv Sit·eden Irrigation Dist., supra l 56 Idaho at 254,
322 P.3d at 987; citing, Bedke v. Pickett Ranch & Sheep Co., 143 Idaho 41, 137 P.3d at 428. It
was emphasized that the District Court has never precisely defined the "point of entry" for New
Sweden's use of its easement for any specific use, nor is the point of entry defined in New
Sweden's By-Laws. It was argued on this issue that the Morgan property is divided into three
identifiable sections i.e. the Southwest section where the canal crosses an open field; the middle
section where the canal crosses the landscaped area; and, the Northeast section where the canal
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crosses the graveled area. For use of New Sweden's behemoth mower, entry from the Northeast
or middle sections is neither reasonable, nor necessary, because mowing is not needed in either
of those sections. Entry for mowing should be limited based on intended use to only the
Southwest end of the property. Entry for excavation of sediment or debris should be limited
based on point of need and time of need i.e. it makes no sense to enter the easement on the
Northeast end if the debris and sediment is located only in the Southwest section; and, at this
point in time, there is no sediment or debris to be removed.
New Sweden, as indicated, responded and objected to any amendment to the original or
new judgments. Why? New Sweden emphasized in its response and objection to
reconsideration that this decision is important to it as a "remedial measure to clarify New
Sweden's view of what the scope of the right-of-ways are to avoid future litigation from other
constituents." R. p. 58. Although the argument is made that this decision does not apply to other

property owners, if New Sweden does apply this decision in defining the scope of its easement,
when applied to all owners of irrigated land within the New Sweden district, there are homes,
fences, granaries and thousands of trees within New Sweden's easement across other sections of
property that will be impacted by this decision. In addition, it was argued in the motion to
reconsider that the District Court cannot ignore the fact that Rocky Mountain Power has installed
a power transfonner at each end of the canal that crosses the Morgan property that services all of
Canyon Creek subdivision and has also installed a power transfonner behind Mr. Morgan's home
to provide power to his home, all of which are within 16 feet of the bank of the canal. This
Court's decision requiring the removal of all encroachments within this specific easement already
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impacts Rocky Mountain Power, which is not even a party to this action and is not a constituent
of New Sweden. Who is going to remove the power transformers belonging to Rocky Mountain
Power and how are they going to do that?
The District Court acknowledged that such conversation seemed very reasonable prior to
trial, prior to the appeal, and prior to the subsequent trial; but, " ... today those things have been
established." 09/15/14 Hearing T p. 11, ll. 7-10. As to the point of entry, for example, the
District Court appears to have determined that was not necessary, because "you simply assume"
it "begins at the boundaries of the property both north or south or whatever the directions are
measured by." 09/15/14 Hearing T p. 18, ll. 11-16. New Sweden apparently agrees that the
access points are already defined by that "assumption." 09/15114 Hearing T p. 18, ll. 21-22.
New Sweden also argued that the District Court had already ordered Morgan to remove all of the
encroachments and that decision had gone up on appeal and had been sustained by Idaho's
Supreme Court. 09/15/14 Hearing T p. 19, ll. 20-25, 09/15/14 Hearing T p. 20, ll. 1-3. It is
again emphasized that the August 12, 2012, Judgment that went up on appeal did not identify the
access points, did not order Morgan or anyone else to remove any of the encroachments, but New
Sweden then suggested that if it demanded Morgan to remove the encroachments and he failed or
refused, it had the right to have him held in contempt of court for violating the court's judgment.

09/15/14 Hearing T p. 21, ll. 13-17.
The District Court denied the motion to reconsider and declined to make any changes to
the Judgment entered August 16, 2012, or the Judgment entered August 20, 2014, and directed
counsel for New Sweden to prepare an order denying the motion for reconsideration and the
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Defendant's request for attorneys fees. 09/15114 Hearing T p. 41, ll. 7-13. Contrary to that
simple directive, counsel for New Sweden submitted and the District Court entered an Order on
September 26, 2014, that purported to alter or amend one or both of those judgments by: ( 1)
ordering that power transfonners and other encroachments not controlled by Morgan are
irrelevant; (2) the Court will not address issues previously addressed and resolved by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Morgan v. New Sweden Irrigation District, supra; (3) the frequency by which
Defendant New Sweden accesses the Morgan property is irrelevant; (4) Defendant New Sweden
may enter the easement consistent with the judgment, namely at points of entry at either end of
the Morgan property along the canal; the Court concludes that all encroachments that are located
within the defined easement are unreasonable and must be removed. In the event Plaintiff
refuses to comply with the Court's order he may be held in contempt; and, (5) the Court denies
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration address some of these issues without them being included
in a judgment. R. p. 75. There was no explanation as to why the District Court did not direct this
Order be incorporated in an amended judgment if the parties were intended to be bound by these

rulings.
Morgan responded with a Motion to Alter or Amend Order entered on October 3, 2014,
and which was heard by the District Court on November 12, 2014. R. p. 83. The substance of
that motion was that in signing the Order entered on September 26, 2014, the District Court had
gone beyond what it had ordered from the bench; i.e. the District Court at the time of the hearing
had very explicitly said it was not going to alter or amend any of its findings of fact and
conclusions of law; it was not going to alter or amend the original Judgment entered August 16,
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2012; and, it was not going to alter or amend the Judgment entered following trial on August 20,
2014, stating that" ... according to this Court's view there are judgments in place that can be
enforced." 11/12/14 Hearing T p. 40, l. 25, Hearing T p. 41, l. 1. Even counsel for New
Sweden recognized that" ... the Court could craft an additional document as its amended final
judgment, should the Court decide to do that, so as to resolve these issues with finality, so that
we could get them all properly in front of the Supreme Court." 11/12/14 Hearing T p. 20, ll. 16-

20. The District Court declined and entered its Order on November 14, 2014, simply denying
Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the September 16, 2014, order and denying Defendant's
request for attorneys fees. It should be noted that by this point in the proceedings, the District
Court had entered its final Amended Judgment entered on November 6, 2014, and none of the
issues addressed in the Court's September 16, 2014, Order were incorporated into that Amended

Judgment.
The only final judgment subject to appeal is the Amended Judgment entered on November
6, 2014, and the District Court expressed its concerns whether it provides for finality on the
definition of New Sweden's easement. 11/12114 Hearing T p. 30, ll. 1-3.
Morgan filed his Amended Notice ofAppeal on December 17, 2014, from the Amended

Judgment entered on November 6, 2014. R. p. 147.

III.

STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS

The facts which are relevant to the present appeal from the Amended Judgment entered on
November 6, 2014, are:
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I. The District Court denied Morgan's motion for a trial by jury on remand as to all
issues of fact relative to the precise definition of New Sweden's easement across the Morgan
property.
2. The District Court restricted the witnesses and exhibits for both parties to those that
had been previously identified in the course of the summary judgment proceedings; refused to
allow new photographs offered by both sides that may have illustrated the use or non-use of the
specific equipment that was at issue; refused to allow the testimony of current members of the
Board of Directors on any issue before the District Court on remand; and, the District Court
refused to consider the By-laws of New Sweden that had been amended in 2012 after the District
Court's decision in this matter.
3. An Amended Judgment was entered on November 6, 2014, purporting to precisely
define New Sweden's easement, but did not incorporate the definition of that easement as set
forth in the original Judgment entered on August 16, 2012. The Amended Judgment only defines
where the width of the easement starts.
4. There still is not a judgment entered which identifies the point of entry, identifies who
is responsible for the removal of vegetation within the easement, identifies who is responsible for
the removal of any other encroachments, or determines when such encroachments must be
removed or if they even have to be removed if New Sweden is no longer using the subject
equipment that allegedly mandated removal of any encroachments.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 16 of31

ISSUES ON APPEAL

The Plaintiff, as Appellant, submits the following issues to be considered on appeal:
1. Whether the District Court on remand erred by failing or refusing to allow a trial by
jury on issues of fact.
2. Whether the District Comi on remand abused its discretion and/or erred by failing or
refusing to allow and to take into consideration new evidence and allow new witnesses and new
arguments beyond those that had been previously identified in the course of the summary
judgment proceedings.
3. Whether the District Court erred on remand by failing or refusing to incorporate the
prior Judgment entered on August 16, 2012, into the Amended Judgment entered on November
6, 2014, so that there is a final judgment precisely defining the easement awarded to New
Swed en and addressing (I) the length of the easement and where it starts and ends; (2) the width
of the easement and where it starts; (3) the access and entry points to the easement; (4) expressly
identifying encroachments, including vegetation, which unreasonably or materially interfere with
New Sweden's use of the easement; and, (5) assigning responsibility for removal of each specific
encroachment.
4. Whether the District Court erred on remand by failing or refusing to precisely define
the easement awarded to New Sweden by limiting the removal of encroachments that do not
immediately unreasonably or materially interfere with use of the mower or excavator used by
New Sweden and to limit the use of the mower to only those areas on Morgan's land that can or
need to be mowed and to limit or restrict the use of the excavator prospectively to when and
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where the use of that equipment is actually needed.
ARGUMENT
I.

Trial by Jury on Remaining Issues

Morgan moved the District Court pursuant to Rules 38 and 39 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure (IRCP) and the Constitution of the State of Idaho for entry of an Order directing a trial
by jury on all remaining issues of fact. New Sweden's counterclaim for declaratory judgment
expressly requested trial by jury on all issues of fact relevant to the scope of New Sweden's rightof-way pursuant to Rule 38(b). Idaho Code§ 10-1209, which is part ofldaho's Declaratory
Judgment Act, expressly provides that when a proceeding under this act involves the
detennination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined in the same manner as
issues of fact are tried and determined in other actions at law or suits in equity and crossreferences to IRCP Rules 38 and 39. IRCP Rule 57(a) expressly provides that the procedure for
obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to the statutes of this state shall be in accordance with
these rules and the right to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the
manner provided in Rules 38 and 39. IRCP Rule 38(d) requests the consent of the parties to
withdraw a demand for jury trial by either party. Morgan did not give his consent to withdraw
that demand and did not waive his right to a trial by jury on issues of fact relative to the
declaratory judgment action once that demand was made. The District Court erred as a matter of
law in denying Morgan's motion for trial by jury on all remaining issues of fact.
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II.

Consideration of New Evidence, \Vitnesses and Arguments

It is acknowledged that whether a trial court takes into consideration new evidence and/or
new arguments is a discretionary power available to the trial court recognized by Idaho's
Supreme Court, not only under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, but also under common law.

Davison's Air Service, Inc. v. Montierth, 119 Idaho 967, 968, 812 P .2d 27 4 ( 1991 ). On remand,
the District Court was addressing new issues that had not been resolved as part of the summary
judgment proceedings. The District Court detennined that an evidentiary trial on these issues
was necessary, but then not only denied a trial by jury, but also precluded the introduction of new
evidence, new witnesses and new arguments. The new evidence consisted of photographs
illustrating the actual use of the subject equipment identified by both parties, amended By-Laws
that were not available at the time of the summary judgment proceedings and which defined the
width of the easement and where it starts for all property owners, and brochures currently in use
by New Sweden and expressly illustrating the point at which the width of the easement was to be
measured from; and, the new witnesses consisted of members of the Board of Directors for New
Sweden who could and should have been allowed to comment on actual policy for New Sweden
defining and controlling what equipment was considered reasonable and necessary for the
intended uses on the Morgan property and whether there was a continuing need for the use of that
equipment given issues over accessibility caused by encroachments within the easement
constructed or placed there by a power company that was not a party to these proceedings.
Failure or refusal to allow and take into consideration the new evidence of both parties, the new
witnesses identified by Morgan on the issues relevant to a precise definition of New Sweden's
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easement and new arguments on what was needed to precisely define the easement at this
location constituted an abuse of the District Court's discretion.
III.

Failure to Precisely Define the Easement

This Court, the District Court and both parties have acknowledged that a judgment which
purports to define an easement's existence on another's land "must describe the lands specifically
and with such certainty that the court's mandate in connection therewith may be executed, and
such that rights and liabilities are clearly fixed and that all parties affected thereby may readily
understand and comply with the requirements there." Kosanke v. Kopp, supra 74 Idaho at 307,
261 P. 2d at 818.

In precisely defining the easement awarded to New Sweden in this case, under the
standard set forth in Kosanke, Id. the District Court should have addressed and precisely defined
(1) the length of the easement and where it starts; (2) the width of the easement and where it

starts; (3) the entry and exit points to the easement, which the District Court and New Sweden
acknowledged were at the North and South ends of the easement; (4) expressly identified
encroachments which unreasonably or materially interfere with New Sweden's use of the
easement; and, (5) assigning responsibility for removal of each specific encroachment, which the
District Court and New Sweden acknowledged would limit Morgan's responsibility to only those
encroachments which he constructed or placed within the easement.
Even counsel for New Sweden acknowledged that there will be no finality until that is
done. ll/12/14HearingT.p. 26, ll. 14-19.
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A. Length of the Easement. It was undisputed and the District Court merely

made it clear that the easement rnns the entire length of the canal that crosses the Morgan
property. The length of the easement has never been an issue in this matter, unless the
District Court were to recognize that where the easement starts and ends for specific uses
needs to be precisely defined such as outlined above and suggested by Morgan as to each
piece of equipment.
B. \Vidth of the Easement and \Vhere it starts. The District Court defined the

width of the easement as I 6 feet as part of the original Judgment. Although that may
have been at issue prior to the first appeal, that issue was rendered moot with the adoption
by New Sweden of its Amended By-Laws now expressly providing as to all owners of
irrigated land within the District and as to all sections of its canal that the width of the
easement is 16 feet on each side of the canal. At first glance, that definition appears clear
and precise and it was adopted by the District Court in this case. The problem is, both the
amended By-Laws and the District Court have further defined the width as being" 16 feet
of flat surface." What happens when there is not 16 feet of flat surface abutting the
canal? The District Court, as indicated, expressed concern about the width of the
easement and where it starts when the stmi of a flat surface is an extended distance from
the edge of the canal. It is not enough to say that the starting point is "beginning from the
outside toe of the berm, levy or bank, where the land begins to level out." If the land does
not level out for an extended distance, then New Sweden should be given the
responsibility ofleveling the land to a specified beginning point along the bank of the
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canal in that location; or, acknowledge that the easement cannot be used by the specified
equipment at that location so as to not unreasonably interfere with the use of that section
of land by the servient estate. Morgan v. Nevt· Siveden Irrigation District, supra 156
Idaho at 255, citing, Bedke v. Pickett Ranch & Sheep Co. 143 Idaho at 41, 137 P.3d at
427.
C. Access and Entry Points. As indicated by the Idaho Supreme Court on

remand, entry must take place in a "reasonable manner as not to increase needlessly the
burden on the servient estate." Id. The District Court has never precisely defined the
"point of entry" for New Sweden's use of its easement for any specific use, nor is the
point of entry defined in New Sweden's By-Laws. As indicated, the District Court
"assumed" and New Sweden apparently agreed, that the entry point was limited to the
North end where the canal first begins to cross the Morgan property and the South end
where the canal exits the Morgan property. 09/15/14 Hearing T p. 18, ll. 11-16;
09/15/14 Hearing T p. 18, ll. 21-22. Unfortunately, the District Court declined to

incorporate its "assumption" into its judgment on remand and that issue remains
unresolved.
Morgan did ask that the District Court even more precisely define the entry point
of the easement for each of three identifiable sections on his property i.e. the Northeast
section where the canal enters on his property and crosses the graveled area; the middle
section where the canal crosses the landscaped area behind his home; and, the Southwest
section where the canal crosses an open field and exits his land. For use of New
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Sweden's behemoth mower, entry from the Northeast or middle sections is neither
reasonable, nor necessary, because mowing is not needed in either of those sections.
Entry for mowing should be limited based on intended use to only the Southwest end of
the property. Entry for excavation of sediment or debris should be limited based on point
of need and time of need i.e. it makes no sense to enter the easement on the Northeast end
if the debris and sediment is located only in the Southwest section; and, at this point in
time, there is no sediment or debris to be removed. If the objective is a final resolution of
this matter, no owner of irrigated land within the New Sweden Irrigation District could
take offense if the Court restricts the point of entry based on use and time of use, because
this description is not described in New Sweden's By-Laws, but is limited by what is
"reasonable and necessary" and does not "unduly burden the servient estate."
Counsel for New Sweden acknowledged that the District Court certainly could
take the opportunity to put the Court's ruling in a fashion so there can be finality, at least
as to this owner. 11/12114 Hearing T p. 20, ll. 14-20; T p. 26, ll. 14-19. The District
Court declined and left us to go forward with the appeal on the Amended Judgment
entered November 6, 2014, with no precisely defined entry or exit points. 11112114

Hearing T p. 30, ll. 17-22.

D. Removal of all Encroachments. In order to prevent discrimination and the
arbitrary and capricious use of New Sweden's easement, any individual owner of irrigated
land within the New Sweden Irrigation District has the legal right to seek a declaratory
judgment compelling New Sweden's Board of Directors to enforce the removal of all
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encroachments within the defined easement along the entire 125 miles of its canals based
on the judgment entered in this case. Recognizing what it is inviting, the District Court
could have and should have taken the opportunity to more clearly define with specificity

where along each section of the canal banks on the Morgan property the easement is to be
measured for each of the intended uses and to restrict the use of that easement only to
those places and those times when mowing and/or excavation is actually needed; and, in
conjunction therewith, that the removal of encroachments be addressed as to each

individual encroachment and as is "reasonable and necessary" for each of the intended
uses by New Sweden so as to not increase needlessly the burden on the servient estate,
recognizing that what is defined as "reasonable and necessary" is a standard that
eventually will apply to all owners of irrigated land within the District and as to all
sections of New Sweden's canal.
There is no judgment entered which precisely defines what "all encroachments"
means, although it appears to order that the horse manger and garage, which are part of
one single building, constitute an encroachment that must be removed; that the
underground sprinkler system is an encroachment that must be removed, although there
was no finding that any part of the sprinkler system is within the easement; that the
garden plot, which was destroyed by New Sweden is an encroachment that must be
removed, although it no longer exists; and, that "trees" within the easement are an
encroachment that must be removed. If that ruling expands the new definition of the
easement contained in New Sweden's amended By-Laws, then it would appear to suggest
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that no buildings will be allov.red within the easement and no trees of any kind will be
allowed within this easement. There are buildings, including homes along the canal that
are within this easement; there are granaries along the canal within this easement; there
are miles of fences along the canal within this easement; and, there are literally thousands
of trees along the canal within this easement. That will be the effect of this judgment ifit
is upheld without amendment on appeal.
E. Assignment of Responsibility for Removal of Encroachments. Even if it
stands that all encroachments within the easement must be removed, Morgan asked the
District Court on reconsideration to assign responsibility for removal of any specific
encroachments which it ordered had to be removed. At a minimum, make it clear that if
encroachments had to be removed, Morgan was not responsible for the removal of
encroachments beyond what he had constmcted or placed within the easement, which in
this case is limited to the one building containing a garage and horse manger. There is no
judgment assigning responsibility for the removal of any of the encroachments.
The Judgment that purports to control the removal of encroachments suggests that
all trees must be removed. There was only one tree that was identified and that is the tree
in the middle of Morgan's lawn. New Sweden responded suggesting that "New Sweden
has never told Mr. Morgan that he needs to remove this tree that he just referred to,
because we don't claim that he placed that in our easement." 1I112/14 Hearing T p. 25

ll. 19-21. Regardless, there is no judgment assigning responsibility for the removal of
this encroachment.
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The Judgment that purports to control the removal of encroachments, as indicated,
orders the removal of all encroachments, but does not mention the power transformers
belonging to Rocky Mountain Power. New Sweden responded suggesting that it was not
the responsibility of Morgan to remove the power transformers.

11 /12/14 Hearing T p.

25 ll. 12-15. Regardless, there is no judgment assigning responsibility for the removal of

these encroachments and the Court simply responded suggesting that the power
transfonners are "irrelevant." R. p. 75.
IV.

Failure to Include Owner's Right to Use of the Easement that does not
Unreasonably or Materially Interfere with New Sweden's Use.

This Court held and emphasized in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist., 135 Idaho 518,
522, 20 P.3d 702 (2001) that the law is well settled with respect to the correlative rights of
dominant and servient owners of easements. The owner of the servient estate is entitled to use the
estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does not materially interfere with, the use of
the easement by the owner of the dominant estate. Citing, Boydstun Beach Ass'n 111 Idaho at
377, 723 P.2d at 921 (Ct. App. 1986.) In other words, the servient estate owner is entitled to
make uses of the property that do not unreasonably interfere with the dominant estate owner's
enjoyment of the easement. Citing, Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 890, 728 P.2d 778, 779 (Ct.
App.1986). Although the owner of an easement has the right to enter the servient estate in order
to maintain, repair, or protect the easement, the easement owner may do so only when necessary
and in a reasonable manner as not to increase needlessly the burden on the servient estate.
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The Judgment which purports to control the use of the land within the easement does not
preserve to the owner any right to make use of that land in any way, stating, instead, that Morgan
is enjoined from any way in interfering with New Sweden's use of its easement without
preserving to Morgan, as the owner, the right to use that land in any way that does not
unreasonably interfere with New Sweden's enjoyment of its easement; and, by restricting New
Sweden's access to only those times when necessary and in a reasonable manner as not to
increase needlessly the burden on Morgan's use of his land at all other times and in all other
ways.
CONCLUSION

It is undisputed that New Sweden had, and has, a statutory easement as is reasonable and
necessary to properly clean, maintain and/or repair its canal that runs along the westerly boundary
of Bradley Morgan's land. This matter was remanded to the District Court recognizing that the
Judgment entered August 16, 2012, does not precisely define that easement and, as a result, that
Judgment does not" . .. describe the lands specifically and with such certainty that the court's
mandate in connection therewith may be executed, and such that rights and liabilities are clearly
fixed and that all parties affected thereby may readily understand and comply with the
requirements there." Kosanke v. Kopp, supra 74 Idaho 307,261 P.2d at 818.
The District Court recognized the need for an evidentiary hearing to obtain factual
evidence in more precisely construing the easement which it had confirmed, but then denied a
jury trial on those factual issues; denied the right to offer evidence on those factual issues,
including photographs offered by both sides, the amended By-Laws of New Sweden now
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defining the width of the easement and where it starts for all property owners; and, denied the
requested testimony of any of New Sweden's Board of Directors on those factual issues. You
have to question why there was even a trial on remand. Failure to permit a trial by jury where
one had been demanded by New Sweden on all factual issues was an error oflaw. Failure to
permit new evidence and new testimony was an abuse of the District Court's discretion.
Nothing in the original Judgment entered August 16, 2012, was amended as necessary to
precisely define any of those issues, including:
1. The identification of the type of equipment that is commonly used by New Sweden to
clean, maintain, or repair this particular section of the Sinkhole irrigation canal and to which this

Judgment pertains.
2. Whether the right of New Sweden to remove vegetation and trees growing along and
within the right-of-way includes the right to demand that Morgan be responsible for the removal
of such vegetation and trees, especially if he neither planted, nor placed that vegetation and/or
those trees within that right-of-way. If Morgan is responsible for the removal of vegetation, he is
already mowing the law and cutting the alfalfa and there is no continuing need for New Sweden
to enter on his land with its behemoth lawn mower that caused this dispute.
3. Who is responsible for the removal and/or the cost of removal of any particular
encroachments within that right-of-way, including whether New Sweden can demand that
Morgan be responsible for the removal and/or cost of removal of any of such encroachments,
especially if he neither constructed, nor placed a particular encroachment within that right-ofway. The only encroachment placed by Morgan within the easement that is at issue is the one
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building housing a garage and horse manger. There is no judgment limiting Morgan's
responsibility to this one encroachment.
4. When any such encroachments must be removed, especially if it is factually
determined that New Sweden is no longer using and/or capable of using the specifically defined
equipment for cleaning, maintaining, or repairing this particular section of the Sinkhole irrigation
canal and to which this Judgment pertains. It has now been almost 16 years since the 2009
incident and New Sweden has never been back on the Morgan property with either the mower or
the excavator that it so vehemently contended was ''necessary" to repair, clean or maintain the
banks of the canal in this location. Apparently, use of this equipment was not as necessary as
New Sweden represented.
5. The entry and exit points for the use of the easement have never been defined by a
judgment, although both the District Court and New Sweden assume and agree that the those
points are at the North end and the South end of New Sweden's easement. That entry and exit
point should be precisely defined so as to be enforceable by both parties.
When both Morgan and New Sweden invited the District Court to address these issues, it
declined to amend either of its judgments to provide finality to this matter.
Ifthere is to be some finality to this matter and if the District Court is going to precisely
define New Sweden's easement, then in this case the only encroachments for which Morgan can
be held responsible is the one building he constructed or placed within the easement; the width of
the easement and where it starts is that defined in New Sweden's Amended By-Laws adopted in
2012 after the entry of the District Court's original Judgment and which apply to all property
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owners, including Morgan, but should be precisely defined when there is a slope that extends the
starting point beyond the 16 feet of width; and, the entry and exit points are limited to the
Northern and Southern ends of the easement as expressly acknowledged by both New Sweden
and the District Court.
If the District Court really wanted to bring finality to this matter, it would have taken into

consideration the fact that it has now been 16 more years since New Sweden felt it "reasonable
and necessary" to use its behemoth lawn mower to mow along this section of the canal; that it
has never felt it "reasonable and necessary" to use its excavator on the Morgan property, but the
photographs that it would have offered would have shown the use of this excavator on the other
side of the canal at this location on which there is a 16 foot wide road that runs the entire length
of the Morgan property; and, until it compels Rocky Mountain Power to remove its power
transformers located on the Morgan property, it is factually impossible to drive either of these
pieces of equipment from one end of the Morgan property to the other end within the easement
that it has demanded.
The reality is that this action against Morgan has never been based on the "reasonable and
necessary" need to repair, clean or maintain this section of the canal. This action has one
purpose and one purpose only; i.e. to harass and intimidate an owner who demanded his rights
relative to his land as a "remedial measure to clarify New Sweden's view of what the scope of
the right-of-ways are to avoid future litigationfi·om other constituents." R. p. 58.
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